Accountability in Governance Networks: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina

In this article the authors expand Romzek and Dubnick’s public accountability model (1987) to fit the complex intricacies of governance networks. A Governance Network Accountability Framework that draws upon traditional public accountability, market accountability, and lateral accountability frameworks is presented. The application of this accountability framework to the response and recovery governance networks operating in the wake of hurricane Katrina illustrates how “hybridized accountability regimes” (Mashaw, 2006) exist within governance networks. Some conclusions that may be drawn from this study include: The accountability structures of individual network actors impact the hybridize accountability regimes of the whole governance network; and Inter-organizational network accountability may be viewed in terms of vertical and horizontal relationships and that these dynamics may lead to trade-offs between bureaucratic and lateral accountability types.

The disaster that resulted from the landfall of hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, may be understood as the result of multiple failures in the accountability regimes of the “governance networks” (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005) responsible for planning for and responding to it. Comfort has identified at least 535 different organizations, spanning the public, private and non-profit sectors involved in the response and recovery activities relating to hurricane Katrina (2007). The disaster exposed, “failed systems of engineering, economics, public safety, logistics, recovery, and race relations” (Cigler, 2007b, 64). These failures were promulgated by a lack of a coordinated response between levels of government and across the governmental, non-profit and private sectors, as well as the failure of leaders to execute sound, professional judgment (Kettl, 2006). As planning for future catastrophes gets contemplated the question of “who is to blame?” must get supplanted by the question “who is accountable for what?” As we shall see, the case of hurricane Katrina highlights the complexity inherent to coordinating activities of inter-organizational actors with discrete jurisdictions and accountability structures.

Although the case of hurricane Katrina provides essential lessons for emergency management responses to catastrophic disasters, the case also sheds light on challenges associated with governing within networked environs in a much more general context. Behn has gone as far to assert that, “…most failures in performance are failures of collaboratives,” recognizing that, “in the United States, most public policies are no longer implemented by a single public agency with a single manager, but by a collaborative of public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations” (2001, 72). In times of crisis, as well as during the
course of the day to day administration of the public’s interests, networks of actors spanning the public, private and voluntary sectors are mobilized to provide public goods and services and address pressing social needs. Mathur and Skelcher (2007) argue that the complexity inherent to governance networks, “obscures the process of and accountability for public policy formulation, decision making, and execution. Yet conversely, it opens the door to involvement by a wider range of actors and in ways that are less constrained than those applying to institutions of elected political authority” (235). An accountability framework for governance networks is needed to ensure that, amidst the ebb and flow of actors and agendas, the public interest remains paramount and is ultimately served.

In this article we expand Romzek and Dubnick’s public accountability model (1987) to accommodate the complex relationship inherent to governance networks. A network accountability framework that draws upon traditional public accountability, market accountability and lateral accountability frameworks will be introduced and applied to the case of some of the governance network responsible for planning for and responses to hurricane Katrina.

**Governance Network: Definitions, Characteristics and Accountability Challenges**

Governance networks are comprised of multiple actors working together to influence the creation, implementation and/or monitoring of public policies. These arrangements have resulted in the development of issue networks (Heclo, 1978), policy networks (Kikert et al., 1997), public-private partnerships (Linder and Rosenau, 2000), third party governance (Salamon et al., 2002), cross-sector collaborations (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006), and strategic alliances (Wohlstetter et al., 2005) that involve a diverse array of actors who may not only span the public, private and voluntarily sectors, but international, national, regional, state, local and individual levels or plains (Guo and Acar, 2005) as well.

Governance networks are implicated in at least one facet of the policy cycle: problem definition; policy design and planning; policy coordination; policy implementation (regulatory); policy implementation (service delivery); and policy monitoring (Bovaird, 2004). While, Milward and Provan
suggest that four distinct network types exist within public management settings: service implementation, information diffusion, problem solving, and community capacity building (2006, 11).

According to Goldsmith and Egger (2004), governance networks are, “initiatives deliberately undertaken by government [oftentimes in relation with actors from other sectors] to accomplish public goals.” The governance networks may possess “measurable performance goals, assigned responsibilities to each partner, and structured information flow,” with the, “ultimate goal of these efforts [being] to produce the maximum possible public value, greater than the sum of what each lone player could accomplish without collaboration” (8). Thus, to be governance networks they must have some form of “democratic anchorage” (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005), most often through the use of a single or some combination of policy tools (Salamon et al., 2002). Sorensen and Torfing assert that, “Governance networks are democratically anchored to the extent that they are properly linked to different political constituencies and to a relevant set of democratic norms that are part of the democratic ethos of society” (2005, 201).

Governance networks can take many different forms, “They can either be self-grown or initiated from above. They might be dominated by loose and informal contacts or take the form of tight and formalized networks… short-lived or permanent, and have a sector-specific or society-wide scope.” (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005, 197). Focusing on the existence of inter-organizational networks, Milward and Provan argue that they can be structured in one of three ways: As “self-governed networks” within which all network actors serve as peers, with power distributed relatively evenly across them; as “lead organization networks” in which a particular network actors plays a lead role in coordinating, maintaining or monitoring network activity; and “network administrative organizations” that serve as a formal coordinating body designed to facilitate the activities of the network (Milward and Provan, 2006, 22). In order to attain some measure of democratic anchorage, governance networks do not need to have government agencies as the lead organization or a major “hub” in the network (Milward and Provan, 2006). Government actors operate within governance networks employing shared governance, lead organization, and network organization structures. Governments may take on the role of leading or following (Koontz et al. 2004) or mandating, endorsing, facilitating or partnering (Fox et al., 2002).
The proliferation of governance networks are calling on public administrators to rethink many of their basic assumptions about their practice, most particularly the notion that the bureaucracy as the unit of analysis, and that the public administrator’s role is relegated to existing within the kind of command and control environments that bureaucracy’s are said to foster (Koliba, 2006). The interest in the concept of “collaborative management” (Agronoff and McGuire, 2003) represents an acknowledgement of the importance of networks by casting light on the need for effective management of both vertical and horizontal relationships. The growing awareness of this shift from a mono-centric system of governance to a “polycentric” system of governance raises some serious accountability challenges (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007), requiring public administrator to move from, “neutrally-competent servants of political executive” to “responsively competent players in a polycentric system of governance” (231).

O’Toole and Meier have noted that “adding actors does more than complexify, it tilts the balance of power” (2004, 684). Taking into consideration the complexity of polycentric systems of governance, Scott has observed that, “[D]ifferent governance mechanisms bring with them distinctive accountability templates” (Scott, 2006, 175). Page (2004), Posner (2002), and Behn (2001) have all noted the accountability challenges associated with governance networks, recognizing their complexity and the potential competing aims inherent to the individual organizations operating within them.

The term “accountability” has its origins as a financial concept and was derived from the Latin word for “to compute” (Posner, 2002, 524). While the origins of the term were quantitative, and some argue financial, in nature, few today would argue that accountability only applies to finances. “Accountability is traditionally defined as the obligation to give an account of one’s actions to someone else, often balanced by a responsibility of that other to seek an account” (Scott, 2006, 175).

The diverse accountability regimes that are inherent in governance networks may be enforced through a series of accountability tools that include explicit and implicit standards (Kearns, 1996), and a recognition and responsiveness to particular individuals, groups or organizations (Maas and Radway, 1959; Mashaw, 2006). Kearns defines explicit standards as being, “codified in law, administrative regulations, bureaucratic checks and balances, or contractual obligations to other organizations….“
(Kearns, 1996, 66). In essence, explicit standards are reified as stable parameters used to structure coordinated action. Such standards are often put into writing and appear as contracts, regulations, laws, performance standards, and formal rules and explicitly stated within performance measures.

Kearns defines *implicit* standards as, “ill-defined and, perhaps, shifting notions of what constitutes responsible or appropriate behavior. [They] are rooted in professional norms and social values, beliefs, and assumptions about the public interest, the public trust, and how (and to whom) organizational behavior should be explained… they can involve powerful sanctions for nonperformance or noncompliance…” (Kearns, 1996, 66-67). Implicit standards exist as “theories-in-use” (Argyris and Schon, 1996) that rely on the active participation of actors to create, recreate, enforce and object to them. Implicit standards may be understood as a weaker accountability tool because they are often predicated on tacit knowledge. Implicit standards may include principal-agent norms, democratic values, policy goals, as well as reciprocity and trust.

Accountability structures require that actors be responsive and responsible to particular constituencies. The seven different accountability types that we will explore in this article may be understood in terms of the set of actors to whom accountability must be rendered. These principal actors, be they citizens, elected officials, courts, supervisors, fellow professionals, owners, consumers or partners, are placed in the position of judging the performance of the actors that are being held accountable. These principal actors will inevitably prioritize difference combinations of policy goals (Stone, 2002), placing value on and rendering judgment of performance differently (Gruber, 1987; Radin, 2006).

The growing attention played to “performance measurement” within the field of public administration (Frederickson and Frederickson, 2007) through the reinventing government movement and elsewhere, may be understood as an effort of principals to hold agents accountable to discernable goals and objectives. Most discussions of performance measurement in public administration assumes that both principals and agents act rationally, collecting, analyzing, and measuring the inputs, outputs or outcomes of a given activity or combinations of actions. The limitations of rationalism have been well noted (Simon, 1957; Lindblom, 1959), with the matter only getting more complex as more policy actors get
considered (Radin, 2006). For our purposes we will simply note that the principal actors operating within a given accountability type will have many different ways to understand and interpret the performance of the agent actors, employing different combinations of explicit and implicit standards depending on some combination of prevailing norms and situational factors. We will also explore how lateral network relationships are characterized as interactions between peers.

Another challenge to studying how accountability exists within governance networks concerns the role of the accountability structures of individual network actors vis-à-vis the accountability structures of other network actors. Individual network actors possess their own intra-organizational accountability structures. There remains a great deal more to be understood regarding what happens when the accountability structures of one network actor come mingle, compete or complement the accountability structures of other network actors, and the extent to which a “hybrid accountability regime” (Mashaw, 2006, 118) emerges within the governance network.

In cases where a governance network is comprised of non-profit and for-profit organizations working with governments, relying on the accountability structures historically ascribed to governments are not sufficient. Scott observed how “conventional accountability narratives” emphasize, “ex post and hierarchical forms of accountability, with only very limited reach beyond the state actors.” By relying on these conventional views we are unable to provide, “a narrative of accountability that can legitimate governance structures involving diffuse actors and methods” (Scott, 2006, 190).

This review of the literature leads us to draw the following series of assertions: 1. Governance networks can possess a variety of different network structures (Milward and Provan, 2006) and carry out a variety of network functions (Brovaird 2004; Milward and Provan, 2006). 2. Governance networks may involve individual network actors from different sectors and levels. 3. The traditional accountability frameworks ascribed to governments are not sufficient to account for inter-organizational governance networks (Scott, 2006). 3. Individual network actors will possess their own accountability structures that are characterized by a certain combination of explicit and implicit standards (Kearns, 1996) and constituencies. 4. Network actors interact through some combination of vertically and horizontally
arranged relationships (Agronff and McGuire, 2003). Much more needs to be understood regarding the manner in which the accountability structures of individual network actors comingle, compete or complement one another within governance networks, and the extent to which “hybrid accountability regimes” (Mashaw, 2006) form. By building on these assertions, we seek to give shape to the “narrative of accountability” that needs to be developed for governance networks.

In this article we advance a conceptual framework to describe and ultimately evaluate the hybridized accountability regimes of governance networks. This framework will need to take into account the accountability structures of non-governmental actors, particularly market-oriented actors. It will also need to take into consideration the nature of laterally-arranged ties. We now turn to a review of the literature pertaining to public, market and lateral accountability structures, out of which a Governance Network Accountability Framework is constructed. Later in the article the framework is applied to the performance of some of the governance networks implicated in the case of hurricane Katrina.

Public, Market, Lateral Accountability Regimes

The existing frameworks most prevalent in the public and market accountability literature have been largely applied at the level of the individual organization, be it the public bureaucracy for the former, or private business in the latter. We will eventually explore how the differences between the public and the market accountability structures of individual actors lead to accountability “trade-offs.” Within the discussion of lateral accountability we will need to address the nature of inter and intra organizational ties, concluding that inter-organizational relationships, and therefore the very nature of their hybridized, inter-organizational accountability regimes, may be understood as an interplay of vertically and horizontally arranged accountability relationships. In essence, at some point in the analysis, the actors within the governance network will hold each other accountable, meaning that network actors consider (or not) other network actors as a part of the constituencies to which it must hold itself accountable to.

Romzek and Dubnick’s model of public accountability is arguably the most influential framework used to analyze the accountability structures of traditionally organized governmental organizations.
Drawing upon a study of the space shuttle Challenger explosion they illustrate the four different accountability structures at work within NASA, and government actors in general: political, legal, bureaucratic, and professional (1987).

Romzek and Dubnick referred to political accountability as responsiveness to the needs and concerns of political constituents and public stakeholders. Under the expectations inherent to political accountability, “Public agencies are expected to be responsive to other actors within the political system, particularly to elected politicians aiming to control their activities” (Mulgan, 2000, 566). Other interests to be accounted for include: the public-at-large, interest groups, and legislatures. (Maas and Radway, 1959). Political accountability structures allows for the public access to governmental decision-making processes through open meeting laws, freedom of information acts, maximum feasible participation requirements, and sunshine laws. In essence, political accountability confers the vestiges of “democratic anchorage” onto the individual public bureaucracies.

The extent to which potential network actors such as non-profit organizations or private businesses possess a form of political accountability is worth noting. Brooks has written about the similarities between non-profit organization’s accountabilities to its board of directors and the legislators’ oversight of public bureaucracies (2002, 260). However, non-profit board members are not elected officials, and therefore not formal representatives of the public’s interests. The extent to which private business need to be politically accountable is even more ambiguous. We do not have the space to fully explore these matters here. We must suggest, however, that political accountability certainly has a role to play in the governance of non-profits and businesses when they are actors within a governance network, particularly when they serve as contractors, grantees or subjects to regulation by the state. In essence, we will suggest that non-governmental actors are held accountable in a political sense when they operate within a governance network. The democratic anchorage of the governance network should, at least in theory, impact all of the network actors.

Romzek and Dubnick suggest that a legal accountability structure stresses the role that judiciary and quasi-judiciary procedures play in insuring the execution of sound and reasonable judgments within an
organization. All organizations are held to some measure of legal accountability, often predicated on adherence to the “rule of law,” constitutional law, civil and criminal laws, and/or legislative mandates. Legal accountability may be carried out by enforcing binding contractual arrangements that apply to any signatory of a legally binding contract.

Legal accountability within governance networks are likely to be structured through written contractual arrangements existing between network actors. However, more attention will ultimately need to be given to defining the parameters for governance networks’ legal compliance framework. This is a matter that we will not have room to discuss here.

Bureaucratic accountability structures are characterized by hierarchical arrangements through which there are clear relationships between subordinates and superiors relying on the classical principles ascribed to hierarchical, bureaucratic structures such as the “unity of command” and “span of control” (Gulick and Urwick, 1937). These principles may be embodied within formal operating standards and procedures in place, along with stated rules and regulations. Bureaucratic accountability structures lead to the adherence to intra-organizational rules and procedures and, more informally, “principal-agent” norms (Milward and Provan, 1998). This form of accountability stresses the importance of authority embodied within vertically arranged relationships. To a certain extent, large non-profit organizations may rely on bureaucratic accountability structures, as do hierarchically-arranged businesses.

Governance networks may likely rely on bureaucratic accountability structures when some measure of vertical integration between actors exists, particularly in cases when the government is serving as the “lead organization” of the governance network. Therefore, bureaucratic accountability can exist at the intra-organizational level, as well as the inter-organizational level.

Within the context of Romzek and Dubnick’s public accountability framework, professional accountability structures rely on the skills and expertise of “professionals” to inform sound judgments and discretion (1987). They assert that, “Professional accountability is characterized by placement of control over organizational activities in the hands of the employee with the expertise or special skills to get the job
done” (187). Professional accountability may also be maintained through compliance with profession or industry best practices, rules or codes of ethics.

Professional accountability is manifested through networked relationships between other professionals and the means by which they associate with one another. Such associations usually take place through inter-personal networks that transcend organizational boundaries. Thus, within a governance network context, the existence of professional accountability structures can be an important vehicle through which the network coordinates and legitimizes its existence.

Romzek and Dubnick analyze the events leading up to the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion as a failure to rely on the expertise and judgment of the professional engineers embedded within the launch team structure. They argue that the bureaucratic accountability structures and the reliance on the discretion of the managerial authorities attached to it failed the system by ignoring the professional judgment of the engineers. They also blame the political accountability structures as well, citing the political pressures being exerted on NASA’s Space Shuttle Program to launch on schedule (1987). It should be noted that the case of Challenger explosion also implicates a host of other networked actors: most particularly Morton Thiokol, the private firm contracted to build and maintain the space shuttle fleet.

What role did Morton Thiokol’s position as a for-profit, multinational corporation whose major accountability lies in maximizing the profit of its shareholders holders play? The networked nature of the NASA Space Shuttle Program calls on us to consider the role that market accountably structures play within a governance network, particularly as how market accountability is placed in a trade-off with political accountability.

Market accountability may be understood by differentiating between product, capital and labor markets (Marshaw, 2006, 122). The profit-making obligation of businesses dominates private sector accountability structures (Mulgan, 2000). In the private sector, accountability applies to owners and shareholders who have rights to call the company’s managers to account for the company’s performance; then, secondarily, to customers whose main right is to refuse to purchase (Mulgan, 2000, 569). Thus,
market accountability may be divided into two distinct, but interrelated, components: shareholder accountability and consumer accountability (Scott, 2006).

Legal scholars have advanced the “shareholder primacy norm” through which, “Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholders,” (Smith, 1998, 278). Shareholders, or in the case of privately owned businesses, “owners,” are thought to be motivated by the maximization of profit. Shareholder accountability calls for the alignment of performance measures with profitability. Shareholder accountability requirements push companies to undertake the most efficient set of practices possible in order to maximize profits. Shareholder accountability is mediated through the monitoring of certain parameters that are used to determine the company’s profitability. Within the context of governance networks, it becomes important to remember that business or corporate actors will, in all likelihood, be held accountable for growing profits.

Consumerist accountability is a market-based accountability predicated on the ability of consumers to choose between alternative, competing goods or services. Through a consumer’s choice or refusal to purchase, the consumer may be understood as holding a corporation accountable. “The central mechanism of this modality is competition. Thus, a standard is set through the interaction of buyers and sellers, which also forms the basis for monitoring and rewarding compliant behavior through loyalty and for punishing deviant behavior through exit” (Scott, 2006, 178). Mulgan observes that, “While a customer may hold a private sector provider accountable in the case of a faulty individual purchase or contract, he or she has no general right to demand that the private provider offer services that meet his or her perceived needs. In a competitive market, the main mechanism of responsiveness is consumer choice, the capacity of the consumer to exit to an alternative provider” (2000, 569).

Within the context of governance networks, consumerist accountability may be understood within the new public management edict to treat citizens as consumers or customers of public goods and services, with a major caveat being that citizen-customers can make demands for new public goods and services. Such demands may be manifested through the election of public officials, implying here a coupling of political and consumerist accountability structures.
Both individual network actors (Weick, 1976) and governance networks as a whole (Agronoff and McGuire, 2003) are predicated on the relative strength or weaknesses of horizontal ties. When two actors enter into a “horizontal” relationship they are not beholden to the traditional principal-agent dynamics of vertically arranged relationships. Instead, horizontal relationships are premised on cooperation, and ideally trust. The lateral accountability that binds actors as peers or partners exist at the inter-personal level during the course of daily interactions with other (Mashaw, 2006). It should be noted that even within the most hierarchically arranged organizations workers interact with each other as peers or partners organized around collective endeavors, a fact that is particularly documented within the literature on teamwork and small group behavior (Langfred and Shanley, 2001).

Lateral accountability structures may be understood within the context of social capital, and the normative foundations that give shape to social networks. Coleman, Putnam and others have focused on the role that trust, as a critical norm inherent within the reciprocity of lateral relationships, plays in the development and maintenance of social capital. Thompson asserts that trust is a fundamental norm of social networks, asserting trust is, “established to precisely economize on transactions costs, via the deployment of trust” (2003, 32). He goes on to add that, “trust implies an expected action… which we cannot monitor in advance, or the circumstances associated with which we cannot directly control. It is a kind of device for coping with freedoms of others. It minimizes the temptation to indulge in purely opportunistic behavior (Gambetta 1988)” (Thompson, 2003, 46).

Behn observes that trusting behaviors makes one vulnerable (Behn, 2001, 144). Such vulnerability may be mitigated by the opportunity costs that may arise if one does not trust a partner. Behn discusses Axelrod’s treatment of the “iterated prisoner’s dilemma” experiment, in which two actors are asked to replicate the classical prisoner’s dilemma exercise repeatedly over an extended period of time to illustrate the incentives to cooperate. “The evolution of cooperation requires that individuals have a sufficiently large chance to meet again so that they have a stake in their future interaction” (Behn, 2001, 158, summarizing Axelrod, 1980). In essence, repeated interactions make it more likely that actors will cooperate (Behn, 2001, 158). Axelrod argues that, “the foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but
the durability of the relationship.” Durability is built up over time through what he views as a, “trial-and-error learning about possibilities for mutual rewards” and imitation of past successful relationships (1980, 182). Durability also requires network actors to not tolerate deviant behaviors. Axelrod’s study underscores the need for networked actors to challenge such behaviors in an effort to bring about cooperative behaviors (1980, 184). Thus, the “reputational capital” of network actors becomes a key element within the establishment of durable, lateral relationships (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Reputation becomes an important element in the bargaining, negotiating and mutual adjustment activities undertaken in networked relationships (Wise 2006; Morris, Morris and Jones 2007, 95).

Lateral accountability structures revolve around, “reciprocal obligations among members…” through which, “rewards and sanctions… involve such things as acceptance into or expulsion from membership or a change in status in the group” (Mashaw, 2006, 125-126). Scott describes lateral accountability as hinging on standard-setting, feedback, and behavior realignment, “rooted in the capacities of communities to develop social norms and to police them through non coercive mechanisms such as disapproval and, at the highest level, ostracization” (Scott, 2006, 180).

In sum, lateral accountability structures rely on the building of trusting, durable relationships that lead to cooperative behavior. Lateral accountability is enforced through shame, ostracization or disengagement on the one hand, and praise and deeper engagement on the other. Such norms can be reified through formal agreements, MOUs or contracts. Lateral accountability may exist as an integral element of the accountability structure of an individual network actor, or as a central construct in the hybridized accountability regime of a governance network.

The table below illustrates the ways in which the different accountability types rely on a diverse array of accountability tools.

Insert table 1. here
A governance network will likely draw upon a combination of some or all of the accountability types identified above, ultimately creating “hybrid accountability regimes” (Scott, 2006, 185). We will now draw on this typology to explore the hybrid accountability regimes at work within the governance networks responsible for the response and recovery activities in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, paying particular attention to the networks used to process requests for assistance.

Case Study: Processing Requests for Assistance in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina

All toll, the disaster resulting from the landfall of hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 cost $96 billion in property damage, 1,330 lost lives, and involved the evacuation of 1.1 million people (Kettl, 2006, 809). Eighty percent of New Orleans was under 20 feet of water (Derthick, 2007, 37). In any coordinated response to natural or human induced disasters a variety of needs surface that demand the mobilization of actors spanners layers and sectors. The GAO (2006, 16-19) identifies the following response and recovery needs associated with such disasters: Continuity of essential government operations; Emergency telecommunications; Damage and needs assessment; Logistics; Evacuation; Search and rescue; Mass care; Volunteer management and donations; Restoration of lifelines; and Economic assistance and services. Networks of actors are mobilized to meet these and other needs. Indeed, studies of recent responses to such tragedies as 9-11 (Comfort, 2002; Kapucu, 2006), a spate of hurricanes hitting Florida in 2004 (Kapucu and Van Wart, 2006), and Hurricane Katrina (Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006; GAO, 2006; Gazley and Brudney, 2007; Derthick, 2007; Waugh, 2007; Comfort, 2007; Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev, forthcoming) all point out the networked phenomena that arise to meet the response and recovery needs that result from them.

The networks that arose prior to and during the response and recovery phases immediately following land fall of hurricane Katrina were multi-faceted, spanning every sector and all levels. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), essentially the coordinating mechanism between state, mobilized over 220 different governmental, non-profit and business entities (Kapucu, Augustin and
Garayev, forthcoming). Sixty-six thousand people, over 6,000 within the first 36 hours of landfall were deployed (Waugh, 2007, 108).

Comfort estimates that at least 535 different organizations were involved in at least some aspect of the response and recovery efforts. These statistics do not account for the thousands of individual ad hoc rescuers who risked their own lives to save their fellow citizens (Brinkley, 2006).

A series of planning exercises had been undertaken in prior years including the Purple Crescent I, Purple Crescent II, and Hurricane Pam exercises (Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006, 124). The summer of 2005 was also the first hurricane season in which the National Response Plan was in effect (Cigler, 2007b). “By the summer of 2005, several overlapping networks for disaster management were in place in southeastern Louisiana, largely in response to federal stimuli” (Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006, 125).

In addition to frequent media reports regarding failures to provide the needed assistance in a timely and efficient manner, a number of watchdog groups, including the GAO and House Select Committee who have studied the processes and procedures used to allocate assistance found the response lacking. Congress identified the following problems:

- Lack of coordination between organizations across all layers and sectors;
- Communication failures in faulty equipment, poor system designs, untrained operators, unmet budget requests, lack of planning, poor management;
- Information gaps across departments and between jurisdictions;
- Inadequate training, particularly joint training between groups;
- Delays in medical care due to “deployment confusion, uncertainty about mission assignments, and red tape…”;
- Underutilization of the private sector especially with respect to evacuation needs;
- Lack of emergency and temporary shelter;
- Failure of initiative “at all levels [of government] to take a proactive approach to the crisis”(Ink, 2006, 801-802).

“The [House Select] committee stressed that the Katrina failures were primarily the result of a lack of performance, not a lack of plans…” (Ink, 2006, 800). However, the fact that extensive planning had been completed in the years prior to hurricane Katrina’s landfall certainly begs questions regarding the role of planning and exercises as a critical component of emergency management planning. There is very good
reason to believe that the planning and exercises carried out were not extensive enough and failed to tackle some of the more complex components of the response and recovery efforts, including a lack of extensive preparation for the evacuation of non-mobile residents, and the (lack of) interoperability of communication systems between government agencies and other responders such as the Red Cross (Ink, 2006; Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev, forthcoming). In essence, the exercise failed to build trusting, durable relationships.

Studies of the governance networks responsible for the maintenance of the levee system highlight the apparent confusion over who had what authority in maintaining the complex, patchwork system of “hodgepodge of stone and earthen levees, concrete and steel floodwalls, drainage canals, more than 200 floodgates, and huge pumps” (Derthick 2007, 39). The Army Corpse of Engineers, “lacked the capability to judge levee condition accurately because it had no air surveillance, satellite photos, or even representatives on the scene” (Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007, 182) and did not retain responsibility for the levees after construction was done (Derthick, 2007, 39). The Orleans Levee District was charged with a number of responsibilities, with the maintenance of the levee system low on a list of other priorities. Derthick highlights the confusion that existed between the Orleans Levee District, the Army Corps of Engineers, and elected officials (2007). It would appear that the case of the failed levee system brings to light the fact that a competent governance network with the chief function of maintaining the levees did not exist in this case.

Derthick asserts that Katrina did demonstrate the effectiveness of some governance networks, particularly the network that put together the “contraflow” plan that mandated the uni-directional flow of traffic out of the city. Between 1 to 1.2 million people out of a population of 1.4 million were successfully evacuated (Derthick, 2007, 38). In the months prior to the event, 1.5 million Louisiana Citizen Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guides were distributed through media outlets, the Red Cross, and area Wal-Marts, Home Depots, and Lowes, pointing to a successful public information campaign mounted through a network involving actors from across sectors. Of course, the major oversight of planners concerned the
lack of a plan for the evacuation of residents who had no access to transportation in order to flee the area (Derthick, 2007, 38).

Reports put out by the White House, the House Select Committee, the GAO, and some analytical case studies (Ink, 2006; Kiefer and Montjoy, 2006; GAO, 2006; Moynihan, 2007, Baker and Refgaard, 2007) all single out the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serving as a central “lead organization” during the response and recovery phases of crisis. FEMA lost experienced staff during the lead up to Katrina (Cigler, 2007b, 69). FEMA also removed itself from most mitigation and preparation activities associated with hurricane planning in the years leading up to the summer of 2005 (Cigler, 2007b).

Once Katrina made landfall, FEMA was chiefly responsible for coordinating the flow of supplies and services to the region, including the procurement of buses to be used to remove victims stranded at the New Orleans Super Dome and Convention Center. Early on in the crisis, FEMA Director Michael Brown promised local officials that FEMA could deliver the necessary buses needed to evacuate these people in a timely fashion. He sent requests to the US Department of Transportation for 455 buses. Expecting the imminent delivery of the buses, local and regional officials halted, “independent efforts to commandeer buses locally from schools, churches, and other sources” (Derthick, 2007, 42). The buses, however, failed to come because, “they had to be procured from contractors all over the country, hundreds or even thousands of miles away” (Derthick, 2007, 42). Derthick concludes that, “FEMA did not know what it could deliver or when and made promises that were unreliable” (2007, 42). This held true for not only the buses, but the supplies that FEMA did control: generators, food, water, ice…(42).

The figure below illustrates the standard process for requesting assistance that was used during the crisis. It describes what amounts to be a classically organized hierarchy with FEMA at the top and the general public at the bottom.

Insert figure 1. here.
As the lead organization within the response and recovery activities, FEMA was responsible for approving requests and tasking network actors with fulfilling the requests. The Red Cross was responsible for taking the requests that filtered up to it through local government and other voluntary organizations.

A GAO study of the procedures used to process requests for assistance discussed the relationship between Red Cross and FEMA at length (2006). This relationship was said to be marked by a lack of clarity regarding roles; a lack of standard procedures for processing requests; turnover in key Red Cross volunteers; a lack of Red Cross participation in FEMA policy meetings; and sluggishness in letting contracts to key goods and service providers. Each of these findings is described below.

- **Failure to clarify roles and responsibilities.** Conflicts arose between FEMA and the Red Cross regarding the role of the ESF-6 coordinator. To quote the GAO report at length, “FEMA and the Red Cross disagreed about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a FEMA official charged with leading mass care, housing, and human services assistance. FEMA officials told us that the Red Cross should direct all requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator, while Red Cross officials stated that the organization should be able to take requests directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief—not the ESF-6 coordinator. As a result, the two organizations spent time negotiating operating procedures, rather than focusing solely on coordinating mass care services in the early days of the hurricane response effort” (GAO, 2006, Executive summary).

- **Failure to have a standard process for requesting assistance.** Although the system for processing requests outlined in figure 1. was predetermined, the mechanisms for filtering requests from local governments and voluntary organizations to the Red Cross were not fully developed ahead of time (GAO, 2006, 11). The failure to articulate procedures within this stage of the processing system led to a great deal of confusion between actors within the governance network.

- **Rotation of Red Cross personnel leads to lack of continuity.** The Red Cross relies heavily on volunteer personnel, many of whom take leaves of absence from their workplace to devote to public service. The average stint for Red Cross volunteers in disasters of this nature range from a few days to a few weeks. Volunteer staff were placed in key positions within the processing
With no clear system in place for filtering requests from the public to FEMA, it was left to these individual Red Cross volunteers to devise informal means of getting FEMA’s attention and seeing to it that requests were processed in a timely manner. As volunteers cycled out of these key positions, their knowledge and investment in seeing to it that these requests were processed left with them (GAO, 2006, Executive summary).

- **Failure to involve Red Cross officials in important policy meetings.** Frequent “policy meetings” would be convened within the FEMA command center. During these meetings, FEMA and other key government officials would discuss the response and recovery efforts and address problems. Although Red Cross officials were allowed to attend these meetings, they were not allowed to participate within them (GAO, 2006, 13), resulting in missed opportunities to coordinate responses and engage in joint problem-solving.

- **Failure to have pre-determined contractual arrangements with providers of emergency goods and services.** The GAO found that, “… There was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and services… There was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities for contracting activities across agencies and jurisdictions…[and], There was insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight…” (GAO, 2006, executive summary). Failures within the contracting system contributed to the inefficiencies of delivering the needs goods and services.

All of these problems point to challenges relating to the coordination of network actors and, ultimately, a failure within the multiple accountability structures at work within and across the implicated governance networks.

The challenges of processing requests for assistance did not stop at the processing of requests phase. Supplies supposedly en route to the region were held up at airports because of the need to screen personnel and baggage, regulations of the Federal Transportation Security Administration created after 9-11. Also, Homeland Security required Air Marshals on these flights, causing further delays (Cooper and Black, 2006 as references in Derthick 2007, 43).
Assistance did not only flow through FEMA as the central coordinating hub. The EMAC network, coordinately largely through state-level emergency management agencies and governor’s offices, had challenges pertaining to the channeling of supplies and services to the region as well. Waugh (2007) notes that, “Requests for assistance were delayed when governors and their staffs did not understand the EMAC system” (108), adding, “Poor communication between state emergency management offices, including governor’s offices, local agencies meant poor situational awareness and poor response to local needs” (110). We may view these failures in light of accountability types introduced earlier. The table below aligns the overall failures identified by the House Select Committee and the specific failures related to the request for assistance processing system to each accountability type.

The governance networks responsible for the response and recovery needs following the landfall of hurricane Katrina suffered from failures in accountability of all types. The general lack of coordination and failure of initiative may be understood as a problem in the political accountability structures at work. Clearly, elected officials, federal, state and local legislatures and governmental agencies saw the other political actors as chiefly responsible for the coordination and initiative needed to successfully respond to the landfall of a category 4 hurricane. Needless to say, the failure of initiative led to substantive “intergovernmental challenges” (Cigler, 2007b). That a disaster of this magnitude had been anticipated, yet local, state and national elected officials failed to collectively address the very visible crumbling levee system points to failures in the very checks and balances supposedly inherent to our governance system. Stivers (2007) and Jurkiewicz (2007) have examined the subtle, but oftentimes critical, roles that institutional racism and classism played in undermining the political authority of the poor, black residents who made up the disproportionately high percentage of the most effected victims. They have argued that there is a relationship between the perceived powerlessness of this population, and the widespread failure in political accountability.
The general lack of coordination may also be considered as a breakdown in legal accountability, particularly when the matter of contracting practices are taken into consideration. Understood within the context of the system used to process requests, the failure to have pre-determined contractual arrangements with providers of emergency goods and services in place lead to confusion regarding which contractors to work with, how to structure these contracts, and who had authority over them. Ironically, the requirements to follow existing contractual procedures, as in the case of procurement of buses (Derthick, 2007), suggests ways in which existing legal accountability structures may get in the way of expediency, particularly in times of crisis.

A breakdown in the bureaucratic accountability structures can be recognized in the general observations concerning the lack of coordination; gaps in information; communication failure; the slow delivery of goods and services; lack of clarity about roles and authority; and failure of initiative. Within the context of the systems used to process requests for assistance, the problematic principal-agent relationship between FEMA and the Red Cross may be cited. The controversy regarding the place of the FEMA ESF-6 coordinator within the chain of command may be construed as a breakdown in bureaucratic accountability. The time it took to negotiate this chain of command resulted in serious delays.

At the level of the individual network actor, the bureaucratic structure endemic to the Red Cross may be implicated in the bureaucratic accountability failure. The voluntary nature of key Red Cross personnel made it very difficult to sustain any semblance of institutional knowledge, rules and procedures. The predominance of bureaucratic accountability may also be witnessed in the delays associated with the Federal Transportation Security Administration’s requirements to screen all equipment, supplies and personnel that needed to be airlifted into the region (Derthick, 2007). Both of these cases are an illustration of how the accountability structures (and in the internal case accountability failures) impact the performance of the wider governance network.

The loss of key career emergency management professionals within FEMA was cited as a major challenge facing the response and recovery efforts (Kettl, 2006), leading to a breakdown of professional accountability structures. A lack of expertise, inadequate training of key emergency management
personnel, and the failure of initiative may all be linked to a dearth of professional expertise, and by inference professional accountability. The turnover in Red Cross personnel and, in some cases, the lack of professional expertise in processing claims for assistance may be viewed in terms of problem of professional accountability. The lack of professional accountability within the two main actors within the request for assistance governance network illustrates how important it is for individual network actors to have an operational accountability structure. These examples underscore the old adage that a network is only as strong as its weakest link, especially when those link play such an central role within the network.

Garnett and Kouzmin observe that FEMA director, Brown, failed to “widen his decision circle,” indicative of “group think” (2007, 174). While, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and New Orleans Mayor’s Office suffered from “information bias” that contributed to poor situational awareness (174-175). A study of the administrative performance of the EMAC in Mississippi and Louisiana found a dearth of professional development training for key emergency management personnel (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev et al., forthcoming, 21). These oversights suggest the failure of certain network actors to link to, and therefore be accountable to, professional emergency management personnel and those with related expertise.

The role of the for-profit, private business sector in the response and recovery efforts following hurricane Katrina cannot be understated. Beverly Cigler observes that we must be careful not to, “neglect the role of private-sector entities, which own 85 percent of a community’s infrastructure and must work with governments at all levels…” (2007a, 4). As both victims of the disaster and responders to it, local businesses and regional and national corporations had a key role to play in providing supplies and services needed for the response and recovery efforts. The House Select Committee studying the response and recovery efforts cited failures in the delivery of key resources (Ink, 2006). Subsequently, reports of profiteering have been cited (Dreier, 2006). The failure to have pre-determined contractual arrangements with providers of emergency goods and services may have mitigated the problems associated with the sluggishness of response. The drive to maximize profit appears to trump the legal accountability of some profiteers.
The systems in place for Gulf Coast states may be compared to those in place in Florida. Kapucu’s comparison of these systems suggests that Florida benefited from predetermined contracts with providers of goods and services (unpublished). These providers saw it as within their best interest to enter into such arrangements. Shareholder accountability plays a major role in determining the extent to which private businesses are willing to enter into such agreements. With the proliferation of “just-in-time” inventories, in which production is closely aligned with demand in order to cut down on costs associated with storing inventory, the need to maintain efficiency within the system may stand in contrast with the need to stock inventories in cases of emergencies (Cigler, 2007a). A trade-off between shareholder interests and other interests may need to be weighed in this case.

The overall failures in the governance networks responsible for the response and recovery efforts may be construed as failures to the ultimate consumers of goods and services who we may see as the victims of these disasters. Consumerist accountability may be said to not exist within emergency contexts. Victims seeking assistance often do not have the luxury of finding alternative suppliers of needed goods and services. There are no means for consumers to “vote-with-their-feet” or pocket book in cases of emergencies. The inherent monopolies associated with response and recovery efforts essentially render consumers impotent. Add in the elements of race (Cigler, 2007b; Stivers, 2007) and class (Jurkiewicz, 2007) and you get an extremely weakened capacity for the consumers of public goods and service to exercise their individual and collective will.

In times of crisis like these, businesses may look upon their role in disaster response in terms of consumerist accountability by wanting to be conceived as good corporate citizens. Cigler has noted successes in how Wal-Mart’s centralized command and used databases to anticipate needs (2007a, 5). Of course, to take full advantage of Wal-Mart’s capacity to keep its stores in the region stocked with generators and other essential products, the ability of consumers to act like consumers requires that they have the resources to pay for these goods. A consumerist accountability framework may also be overlaid onto charitable organizations like the Red Cross. Donors may choose to allocate dollars or refuse to
allocate dollars to charitable organizations depending on their perceptions of the effectiveness of the charitable organization.

Lastly, the failures in the governance networks associated with the response and recovery efforts need to be considered within the context of failures in lateral accountability. The House Select Committee’s observations regarding the lack of coordination, communication failures, information gaps, and failures of initiative may also be considered within the context of the effectiveness of horizontal ties. Squabbles over jurisdictions and responsibilities may be considered as both problems between principals and agents (and hence a matter of bureaucratic accountability) and problems between peers or partners. The troubled relationship between FEMA and the Red Cross may be viewed in light of their lateral relationships. As a non-governmental organization, the Red Cross receives only indirect oversight from the traditional apparatuses of government. Its “democratic anchorage” comes through the governance by national and regional boards, with some members, particularly at the national level, appointed by elected officials.

The failures to clarify roles and responsibilities as in the cases of the ESF-6 coordinator may be understood as a discrepancy between FEMA and the Red Cross as to which accountability mechanisms were at work. In the traditional command and control system, FEMA edicts regarding its view of the chain of commands would not be questioned. Perhaps, the Red Cross viewed its role more in terms of lateral relationships. They construed themselves, essentially, as partners in the response and recovery efforts. As partners they were to have a say in how best to organize the systems in place to process claims. The GAO’s observation that key Red Cross officials were excluded from important policy meetings coordinated by FEMA speaks to this point.

With the turnover of Red Cross personnel, there existed little opportunities for FEMA and Red Cross workers to build cooperative, durable relationships. Recalling Axelrod’s iterated prisoner’s dilemma, neither party in these exchanges was expecting to keep interacting with the other. The incentives to cooperate did not exist. Putting people in charge of important roles and functions that require extensive time and follow through into temporary roles would appear to be a recipe for systems failure. In the case
of Florida’s emergency management system, existing networks of service providers spanning all three sectors are maintained over time (Kapucu, unpublished). Emergency response functions are written into people’s existing job functions. The institutionalization of these emergency management functions tends to build trust and reciprocity between actors that, in times of crisis, may be drawn upon.

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has been honored for its role in the response and recovery efforts following the landfall of hurricane Katrina. More than one third of the entire Coast Guard fleet was rapidly mobilized (USCG, 2005, as quoted in Baker and Refsgaard, 2007). Baker and Refsgaard observe that, “The key institutional elements that enabled the Coast Guard to function effectively in disaster response were a systemic approach to catastrophic events that included a multi-mission focus, organizational flexibility, and continual examination and improvement of exercise plans.” They cite a key difference between FEMA and the USCG as being USCG’s efforts to work with both civilian and military authorities, and that it possesses an, “organizational structure that encourages that integration with diverse institutions and local groups.” They also recognize that the USCG had an active presence in New Orleans prior to the disaster, claiming that, “this presence built up trust between them, area citizens and key institutions.” They observe that FEMA, in contrast, “though tasked with coordinating the federal response, had relatively few resources devoted to interfacing with local institutions and its bureaucratic approach led to increasing levels of frustration, reduced authority and diminished respect…” (Baker and Refegaard, 2007, 9). Comparing the USCG and FEMA, Baker and Refsgaard assert that the USCG wove a lateral accountability structure into their operations and ultimately their institutional culture. The USCG has been described as being “bureaucratically bilingual,” fluent in the language and systems of other, partnering governmental and non-governmental entities (Kitfield, 2006).

Likewise, Kapucu, et al. (forthcoming) study comparing the networked response of the EMAC in both Mississippi and Louisiana found that the more effective responses of the Mississippi EMAC may be attributed, in part, to the establishment of closer network ties prior to the disaster. The more successful response and recovery efforts found in Mississippi are attributed to the better interstate relationships
between Mississippi and Florida EMACs, pointing, again, to the importance of lateral relationships in emergency management contexts.

Conclusion

The ongoing conversation within the field of public administration about the lessons learned through the case of hurricane Katrina has not, until now, been couched in terms of the lack of, or trade-offs between, accountability structures. The clearest demarcation of such trade-offs in this case occurs between bureaucratic and lateral accountability structures, which may be construed as a matter of vertical versus horizontal alignments. The tensions that arose between the various levels of government as to who had authority and responsibility for what functions may be understood in the context of this trade-off. Historically, such trade-offs have been considered within the context of the degree of centralization needed to effectively execute a governance system.

Within the context of emergency management studies, Moynihan’s (2007) study of “incident command systems” couches his analysis of incident command systems in terms of centralized versus decentralized structures. His analysis looks at what we are calling governance networks at work within the response and recovery efforts as a vertically arranged, hierarchical network, and offers a series of recommendations based on this assumption.

Baker and Refsgaard highlight the importance that more decentralized structures can, and perhaps should, play in emergency management. They draw on the principal of subsidiary function that, “states that authority should be placed at the most local level capable of managing the issue” to ground their argument for local and regional scale matching. They underscore the need to respond to disaster through “adaptive management” and assert that, “the distance between the disaster and the decision-makers in a centralized system may also limit the learning process needed to change strategy rapidly as the situation evolves…” (Baker and Refsgaard, 2007, 4).

Relying on second hand reports that have studied the response and recovery failures, we have asserted that the networks in place exhibited both vertical and horizontal characteristics. The success of
the USCG, for instance, speaks to the important role that lateral relationships, and by implication, lateral accountability structures, play within the system. The failures in the bureaucratic accountability structures at work also point to the need to clarify and refine lines of authority, much along the lines suggested by Moynihan. By looking at governance networks as complex systems that involve a diverse array of vertical and horizontal arrangements we may begin to draw a picture of the ideal type of emergency management system that is, essentially, a complex, adaptive system.

Comfort and her colleagues have described how emergency response networks take on attributes of self-organizing, complex adaptive systems (2002, 2004, 2007). Complex adaptive systems are inherently flexible. They are capable of taking in and processing new information and evolve as conditions change. Based on our study we suggest that the complex adaptive systems that are charged with addressing public needs and providing public services must operate within hybridized accountability regimes that include the political, legal, bureaucratic, professional, shareholder, consumerist, and lateral accountability types. As we have seen through the case of the response and recovery efforts associated with Katrina, all of these accountability types were at work, operating to varying degrees of effectiveness.

How might the consideration of accountability regimes be useful in future planning and further research? We suggest that “accountability audits” can be undertaken to look at the ways in which accountability is understood and responded to. Such an audit may center on the examination of the accountability tools in place. It would lead researchers, planners and practitioners to explore the extent to which certain accountability types present trade-offs for network partners. Roles, responsibilities and functions may be clarified in the process.

We began this article by asserting that the headline-grabbing failure of the governance networks responsible for the response and recovery efforts in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina provides us with an opportunity for the field of public administration to examine the extent to which these failures are aberrations within otherwise effective governance systems, or symptoms of much deeper challenges. That our traditional views of government is shifting to a focus on governance within complex systems has been asserted by many in the public administration field (Salamon et al., 2002; Comfort et al., 2004; Goodsell,
Disasters tend to highlight challenges found in more routine occurrences. Just as Remzek and Dubneck’s study of the Challenger disaster yielded insights into the accountability frameworks at work within governments, we hope that this article has shed light on the complex and messy realities at work within governance networks involving actors spanning sectors and levels.

We believe that the application of this governance network accountability framework to the case of hurricane Katrina leads to three conclusions: 1. The accountability structures of individual network actors impact the hybridize accountability regimes of the whole governance network. 2. The accountability structures of actors from different sectors, particularly the public and private sectors, may lead to certain types of trade-offs, most particularly when accountability to shareholders or owners competes with accountability to the public at large. 3. Inter-organizational network accountability may be viewed in terms of vertical and horizontal relationships and that these dynamics may lead to trade-offs between bureaucratic and lateral accountability types. We have begun to apply the Governance Network Accountability Framework presented here to a myriad of public-private partnerships, contractual arrangements, grants programs and cross-sector collaboratives and invite other researchers to rigorously apply and evolve it.

The public administration field has an important and perhaps unique role to play within the analysis of all forms of governance networks because of our central concern for the quality of democratic anchorage that exists within and around them. Ascertaining the public value of such networks needs to be considered both as a matter of qualitatively and quantitatively defined outputs and outcomes, but also in terms of the accountability regimes in place to ensure that the public interest is being served. We believe that the governance network accountability framework presented here is particularly useful into determining the latter.

**Bibliography**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Governance Network Accountability Tools and Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit, non-binding standards, norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumerist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.

Frequency Distribution of Organizational Response System by Sector and Distribution, Hurricane Katrina, August 26-September 19, 2005

Source: Comfort 2007, extracted from the Times-Picayune (New Orleans), August 26-September 19, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Non-Profit</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Special Interest</th>
<th>All Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal/National</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subregional</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish/County</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Standard Process for Requesting Assistance (Modified from GAO, 2006)

Table 3.
### Accountability Failures within Hurricane Katrina Response & Recovery Governance Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>PERFORMANCE FAILURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td><strong>Overall Response and Recovery Efforts (House Select Committee, 2006)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slow delivery of goods and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of clarity about roles and authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Lack of expertise in DHS, FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inadequate training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder</td>
<td>Lack of resources (just-in-time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profiteering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer</td>
<td>People stranded in squalor conditions; homeless with little means for expressing voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateral</td>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information gaps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Failure of initiative</td>
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